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TAX POLICY AND THE EFFICIENCY 
OF U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD
Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr.
Deferral of U.S. taxes on foreign source income is commonly characterized as a 
subsidy to foreign investment, as refl ected in its inclusion among “tax expenditures” 
and occasional calls for its repeal. This paper analyzes the extent to which tax 
deferral and other policies ineffi ciently subsidize U.S. direct investment abroad. 
Investments are dynamically ineffi cient if they consistently generate less in returns 
to investors than they absorb in new investment funds. From 1982–2010, repatri-
ated earnings from foreign affi liates exceeded net capital investments by $1.1 tril-
lion in 2010 dollars, and from 1950–2010, repatriated earnings and net interest 
from foreign affi liates exceeded net equity investments and loans by $2.1 trillion 
in 2010 dollars. By either measure, cash fl ows received from abroad exceeded 160 
percent of net investments, implying that foreign investment over these periods was 
dynamically effi cient.
Keywords: international taxation, dynamic effi ciency, deferral
JEL Codes: H25, H21, D92
I. INTRODUCTION
Thoughtful observers wrestle with the question of whether the U.S. system of world-wide taxation, including its deferral of the taxation of unrepatriated foreign income, 
provision of foreign tax credits, and other features, ineffi ciently subsidizes direct invest-
ment abroad. To some, the answer is clearly yes. The notion that aspects of current U.S. 
tax policy implicitly subsidize foreign investment has been enshrined by including 
deferral of U.S. taxes on the list of tax expenditures, thereby implying that deferral 
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constitutes a signifi cant deviation from normal tax practice.1 And the possibility that 
proposals to replace the current U.S. worldwide tax system with a territorial tax might 
in the process generate greater U.S. tax revenue adds credibility to the interpretation of 
the current worldwide tax system as a subsidy to foreign investment.
If the current U.S. tax system ineffi ciently subsidizes foreign investment, then U.S. 
fi rms can be expected to invest signifi cant resources abroad, substituting foreign eco-
nomic activity for domestic consumption, thus impairing the effi ciency of resource 
allocation. Musgrave (1963), Horst (1980), and others analyze models in which foreign 
tax credits and deferral of home country taxes on unrepatriated income represent inef-
fi cient subsidies from the standpoint of home countries. However, deferral, the foreign 
tax credit, and other features of the U.S. taxation of foreign income are by no means 
universally regarded as ineffi cient subsidies; indeed, capital ownership considerations 
generally imply that the United States currently imposes an ineffi ciently high tax burden 
on foreign investment, as argued by Desai and Hines (2003, 2004). While this disagree-
ment is framed by welfare considerations, there have been few, if any, direct empirical 
tests of the extent to which foreign investment is ineffi ciently subsidized.
This paper provides one such test by comparing direct investment abroad with repatri-
ated investment returns over the last 60 years. This is a simple cash fl ow comparison of 
the difference between direct investment funds that leave the United States and direct 
investment returns that are received in the United States. This method of evaluating 
investment performance is implied by the theory of dynamic effi ciency: a dynamically 
effi cient investment profi le cannot be improved upon by reducing investment levels. If 
foreign investment consistently absorbs more resources than it returns, then it is dynami-
cally ineffi cient, whereas if the opposite is true — if foreign investment generates net 
cash fl ow surpluses — then it is dynamically effi cient.
The evidence indicates that repatriated returns attributable to U.S. direct investment 
abroad exceed new foreign investments by signifi cant margins. From 1982–2010, the 
repatriated earnings from the foreign affi liates of U.S. companies exceeded net capital 
investments abroad by their U.S. parent companies by $1.1 trillion in 2010 dollars. 
Data for a broader category of investments and investment returns are available for 
a signifi cantly longer time period, and these data reveal a similar imbalance between 
investments and their returns: between 1950–2010, repatriated earnings and net inter-
est from foreign affi liates exceeded net equity investments and loans by U.S. parent 
companies by $2.1 trillion in 2010 dollars. Both measures indicate that cash fl ows 
received from abroad exceeded 160 percent of net investments, implying that foreign 
investment over these periods was dynamically effi cient.
The application of dynamic effi ciency to investigate the presence of subsidies to 
investment abroad is complicated by several factors, which are discussed in detail 
1 According to the Joint Committee on Taxation (2011), deferral of active income of controlled foreign 
corporations is the largest corporate tax expenditure, estimated at $70.6 billion over the period 2010–2014. 
The rising importance of deferral is demonstrated by the fact that the corresponding estimates were $5.7 
billion for 1995–1999, $19.8 billion for 2000–2004, and $25.8 billion for 2005–2009.
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below. The most obvious complication is that the theory of dynamic effi ciency was 
developed for economies on balanced growth paths, whereas in recent decades, foreign 
economies and U.S. direct investment abroad have grown more rapidly than has the 
U.S. economy. These growth rate differentials encourage U.S. fi rms to reinvest foreign 
earnings, a process that depresses repatriations and makes it all the more striking that 
aggregate repatriated earnings far exceed direct investments abroad.
A second concern in analyzing these data is that high U.S. tax rates encourage fi rms 
to reallocate taxable income from the United States to low-tax foreign jurisdictions. If 
there is extensive reclassifi cation of domestic earnings as foreign income, then high 
reported rates of return to foreign investment can be misleading, possibly suggesting 
that investment is effi cient even though it is not. The use of repatriations as a measure of 
foreign investment returns, however, attenuates this concern in evaluating the dynamic 
effi ciency of direct investment abroad. Taxpayers generally have incentives to reallocate 
taxable income from the United States to foreign locations only if they anticipate defer-
ring repatriation of that income; immediately repatriated foreign income is subject to 
U.S. taxation, which removes the benefi t of low foreign tax rates. In addition, taxpay-
ers do not have incentives to defer repatriating if they expect to earn the low rates of 
return associated with dynamically ineffi cient investment. Consequently, the cash fl ow 
measure of foreign investment offers an effi ciency test that is robust to potential income 
reallocation, since there is little if any incentive for a U.S. fi rm to reallocate income 
from the United States to a foreign country only to repatriate that income immediately, 
and fi rms will defer repatriation only if foreign investment is dynamically effi cient.
Section II of the paper reviews the theory of dynamic effi ciency, applies the theory 
to foreign investment, and considers the potential effect of U.S. tax provisions on the 
dynamic effi ciency of U.S. direct investment abroad. Section III evaluates evidence 
of investment returns and levels of U.S. direct investment abroad since 1950. Section 
IV is the conclusion.
II. THE DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
This section reviews the meaning of dynamic effi ciency in a growing economy and 
applies this concept to foreign investment. The analysis identifi es the circumstances 
under which a country that provides foreign tax credits while taxing only repatriated 
foreign income will encourage dynamically ineffi cient levels of foreign investment.
A. Dynamic Effi  ciency
The normative theory of appropriate saving and investment rates was fi rst developed 
in the context of closed economies, for which saving and investment are by defi nition 
equal. Since the early work of Phelps (1961), Allais (1962), Robinson (1962), Swan 
(1964), Koopmans (1965), and Cass (1965), it has been clear that it is possible for a 
growing economy to save too much and therefore also to invest too much. In a simple 
economy with a growing population and no technological change, the Golden Rule 
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capital stock level is that at which the marginal product of capital, net of deprecia-
tion, equals the rate of population growth. Equivalently, the capital stock in such an 
economy is associated with a saving rate that equals the share of capital in national 
income. Maintaining the economy’s capital stock at the Golden Rule level maximizes 
steady state consumption. An economy with a capital stock exceeding the Golden Rule 
level has a marginal product of capital that is less than the population growth rate, and 
is said to be dynamically ineffi cient. If an economy is dynamically ineffi cient, then 
there is overinvestment in the quite powerful sense that there exists a feasible reform 
that would increase consumption in every time period, as elaborated by Phelps (1965).
A clear example of a dynamically ineffi cient economy is one in which there is positive 
annual population growth but investment levels are so great that capital accumulates 
to the point that the net marginal product of capital equals zero (the gross marginal 
product of capital equals the capital depreciation rate). In such an economy there is no 
economic cost to reducing the size of the steady state capital stock, since marginal units 
of capital are unproductive; as a result, it is possible to increase consumption in the 
fi rst period without reducing consumption in any subsequent period. In more general 
settings, dynamically ineffi cient economies populated with representative agents born 
in each period are Pareto ineffi cient, since intertemporal reallocations can provide all 
generations with higher levels of utility. If an economy is dynamically effi cient, then 
any feasible intertemporal reform entails utility losses for some cohorts, which is the 
sense in which dynamically effi cient economies are Pareto effi cient.
Diamond (1965) — generalizing the work of Samuelson (1958) — notes that a per-
fectly competitive economy with overlapping generations can produce dynamically inef-
fi cient outcomes due to the infi nite nature of time and the inability of future generations 
to trade with present generations; Cass (1972) offers a more general characterization 
of dynamically ineffi cient economies. Taxes and other government policies that infl u-
ence returns to saving and investing have the potential to discourage consumption to 
the extent that economies become dynamically ineffi cient.
While dynamic ineffi ciency is evidently feasible, it has not been simple to resolve 
the question of whether economies in practice are dynamically ineffi cient. Mapping 
the theory of dynamic effi ciency to an empirical test must meet the demanding data 
requirements of determining whether an economy’s saving rate exceeds — or is less 
than — its share of capital income; or alternatively, whether the true marginal product 
of capital exceeds — or is less than — the population growth rate. Abel et al. (1989) 
propose a different test based on investment cash fl ows. They show that, for a competitive 
economy characterized by constant returns to scale, whether or not investment in every 
year exceeds total returns to capital investment is also a valid criterion for assessing 
dynamic effi ciency. Specifi cally, if new investment levels exceed investment returns, 
then an economy is dynamically ineffi cient, whereas if investment returns exceed new 
investment levels, then an economy is dynamically effi cient. This cash fl ow criterion is 
equivalent to the other empirical tests of dynamic effi ciency, so an economy in which 
new investment levels regularly exceed investment returns is also an economy in which 
the marginal product of capital is less than the population growth rate.
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Intuitively, the cash fl ow criterion corresponds to whether investment is a sink or a 
source of funds: an economy in which investment continually absorbs more resources 
than it returns is dynamically ineffi cient, whereas an economy in which investment 
regularly generates more returns than it absorbs is dynamically effi cient. Abel et al. 
(1989) offer evidence that gross profi ts from capital investment signifi cantly exceeded 
gross investment levels every year for the U.S. economy from 1929–1985 and other 
G-7 economies from 1960–1984; furthermore, the same was true, to an even greater 
extent, of the U.S. nonfi nancial corporate sector for every year from 1953–1985. Whether 
due to tax, regulatory, monetary, or other policies, or simply the practical operation of 
markets, it appears that western economies did not invest to dynamically ineffi cient 
levels over these time periods.
B. Dynamically Effi  cient Foreign Investment
It is possible to evaluate the dynamic effi ciency of a country’s foreign investment 
by using a cash fl ow measure that is analogous to the measure developed by Abel et 
al. (1989) for a closed economy. As applied to foreign investments, this measure is the 
difference between funds invested abroad and returns from those investments: if the 
difference is positive, then foreign investment is dynamically ineffi cient, whereas if 
the difference is negative, foreign investment is dynamically effi cient. Were the data 
to imply that U.S. direct investment abroad is dynamically ineffi cient, it would follow 
that the United States could increase domestic consumption in every period by reduc-
ing foreign investment.
A simple illustration helps to clarify the sense in which dynamic ineffi ciency implies 
the possibility of increasing domestic resources by reducing foreign investment. Sup-
pose that foreign investment grows at rate g, and let r denote the rate of return earned 
by investments abroad after payment of foreign taxes. For illustrative purposes assume 
that foreign earnings are immediately repatriated to the home country. If g > r, then the 
economy invests more money abroad every year than it receives in return, which by 
both the rate of return and cash fl ow criteria implies that foreign investment is dynami-
cally ineffi cient.
Dynamic ineffi ciency, as represented by g > r, implies that it is possible to increase 
domestic consumption in the fi rst period without reducing domestic consumption in 
any subsequent period. How could this be arranged? Intuitively, domestic investors 
might reduce their foreign investment at the start of the fi rst period by $1, which frees 
$1 for domestic consumption. Reduced foreign investment is not costless of course, 
since yearend foreign earnings thereby decline by r, which then threatens to reduce 
domestic resources newly available at yearend — except that the induced shortfall in 
repatriated foreign profi ts can be made up by further drawing down foreign investment 
by r, thereby leaving the fl ow of yearend domestic resources unchanged. By the second 
period, foreign investment will have fallen by (1 + r), thereby reducing yearend period 
two foreign returns by r(1 + r), and requiring that much additional foreign disinvestment 
in order to maintain the fl ow of domestic resources at the same level as it was prior 
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to the drawdown of foreign investment in the fi rst period. This process can continue 
indefi nitely, assuming that there remain suffi cient foreign assets to be drawn down. 
The $1 reduction in foreign investment in the fi rst period, coupled with compensating 
subsequent drawdowns of foreign investment, entails a foreign capital stock that is 
(1 + r)n smaller by the end of period n.
If g > r, then the stock of foreign assets grows at a rate faster than the contemplated 
drawdown. Letting S0 denote the initial stock of foreign assets, the stock by the end of 
period n will equal S0[(1 + g)
n – (1 + r)n], which increases with n as long as g > r. Con-
sequently, despite the growing annual reduction in foreign assets, there will always be 
suffi cient foreign funds to fi nance the drawdowns; put differently, the shortfall in foreign 
funds diminishes over time compared to the growing size of the foreign capital stock, 
ultimately shrinking to an arbitrarily small percentage of it. Hence dynamic ineffi ciency 
implies that it is feasible to increase domestic consumption in the fi rst period without 
reducing domestic consumption in any subsequent period. Since such a reform can be 
repeated, dynamic ineffi ciency implies that greater domestic consumption is feasible 
in every period by reducing foreign investment. By extension, such a Pareto superior 
reallocation is infeasible if g ≤ r.
C. Taxation and the Dynamic Effi  ciency of Foreign Investment
Under what circumstances would the deferral of home country taxation of foreign 
income, together with the foreign tax credit and other tax provisions, create suffi ciently 
strong incentives that foreign investment becomes dynamically ineffi cient? To address 
this question, it is useful fi rst to identify the investment impact of tax deferral and foreign 
tax credits, and second to consider foreign investment in a system with deferral, foreign 
tax credits, and other potential investment subsidies, the last of which are grouped 
together and denoted by s. Firms subject to home country taxation of repatriated prof-
its have incentives to delay repatriation, and instead reinvest profi ts abroad, if foreign 
after-tax rates of return are suffi ciently great — and there is ample evidence, including 
Desai, Foley, and Hines (2001), that affi liates in countries with low foreign tax rates 
are more likely than others to defer repatriating foreign profi ts. Hartman (1985) notes 
that a fi rm with a subsidiary in a low tax foreign country whose after-foreign-tax rate 
of return exceeds the domestic discount rate has an incentive to reinvest profi ts abroad; 
otherwise the fi rm does better to repatriate its profi ts, incur the domestic tax charge, 
and deploy the remaining funds domestically.
The Hartman result comes from the observation that dividends received from foreign 
subsidiaries (D) are fi rst grossed up to account for the associated pre-tax foreign profi ts, 
and then subject to home country taxation net of foreign tax credits, assuming that the 
domestic tax rate exceeds the foreign tax rate. A dividend of D is therefore subject to 
home country tax of τD/(1 – τ *), in which τ is the domestic tax rate and τ * the foreign 
tax rate; the fi rm is also entitled to claim a foreign tax credit of τ *D/(1 – τ *), as a result 
of which the net tax obligation is D(τ – τ *)/(1 – τ *), and the fi rm’s after-tax dividend is 
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equal to D – D(τ – τ *)/(1 – τ *), or D(1 – τ)/(1 – τ *). As Hartman notes, the repatriation-
and-reinvestment plan that maximizes the present value of D(1 – τ)/(1 – τ *) also maxi-
mizes the present value of D, so repatriation taxes do not infl uence repatriation patterns, 
since in the absence of repatriation taxes the fi rm would choose a pattern of repatriations 
that likewise maximizes the present value of D. Repatriation taxes reduce the value of 
foreign investments from the standpoint of the parent company, and thereby reduce the 
return to initial investment, but need not infl uence repatriation patterns during the time 
that foreign investments are fi nanced by retained earnings abroad.
The Hartman result can serve as the basis of a broader consideration of how foreign 
tax credits, deferral, and additional domestic subsidies might together result in dynami-
cally ineffi cient foreign investment. Consider the case where a multinational fi rm makes 
an equity-fi nanced overseas investment that lasts for n years, producing annual returns 
of r = ρ(1 – τ *), where ρ is the pretax foreign rate of return, τ * is the foreign tax rate, 
and r is therefore the after-foreign-tax foreign rate of return. The foreign tax rate is 
assumed to be lower than the domestic tax rate. The foreign affi liate reinvests its prof-
its every year, and at the end of n years the marginal product of capital falls, reducing 
the incentive to reinvest abroad and prompting the fi rm to repatriate its foreign profi ts 
together with its initial investment. A fi rm investing $1 initially will have accumulated 
(1 + r)n by the end of n years, of which, upon repatriation, all but $1 will be taxable 
by the home country. The home country imposes a tax at rate τ on repatriated foreign 
profi ts, grossed up to include the creditable foreign taxes available on these profi ts, so 
the after-tax funds available to the domestic parent company at the end of n years is:
(1) τ
τ
τ
τ τ
−
−
+⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ +
−
−
+ +
−
r=(1 )
(1 )
(1 ) 1−
(1 )
(1 )
(1 )
( )τ τ
(1 )
.n n1
* *
*
*
It is useful to consider a home country tax system that provides deferral and foreign 
tax credits, and has other features that subsidize foreign investment at rate s and thereby 
effectively reduce the cost of a $1 foreign investment to (1 – s). The fi rm’s alternative 
to foreign investment is to invest the same $(1 – s) domestically, earning an annual 
after-tax return of δ, which by the end of n years is (1 – s)(1 + δ  )n. Equating foreign 
and domestic returns produces
(2) δ
τ τ
+
−
−
−
−
s
(1 ) (= 1 )+
(1 )(1 )τ−
(1 )
( )τ τ
(1 )
.n n
* *
Foreign investment is dynamically ineffi cient if g > r, where g is the growth rate of the 
economy and therefore also the growth rate of foreign investment on a balanced growth 
path; this condition is equivalent to (1 + g)n > (1 + r)n, which from (2) implies that 
(3) δ
τ τ
+
−
−
−
−
g s(1 ) (> 1 )+ (1 )(1 )τ−
(1 )
( )τ τ
(1 )
.n n
* *
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This equation identifi es the conditions under which deferral and the foreign tax 
credit can together support dynamically ineffi cient foreign investment levels even in 
the absence of policies that reduce the cost of foreign investment by s. Setting s = 0, 
(3) implies 
(4) 
δ τ δ
+
+
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ > + − − +
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
g1
1
1
( )τ τ
(1 )
1
1
(1 )
.
n
n
*
Since τ  > τ * by assumption, (4) implies that g > δ is a necessary condition for dynami-
cally ineffi cient foreign investment. As the investment period (n) lengthens, the extent 
to which g must exceed δ in order to support dynamically ineffi cient investment levels 
declines, refl ecting that as the benefi ts of tax deferral increase fi rms are willing to under-
take more marginal foreign investments. Regardless of the length of time over which 
home country taxes are deferred, however, foreign investment will not be dynamically 
ineffi cient unless the growth rate of the economy exceeds the domestic opportunity 
cost of funds.
The potential availability of policies that reduce the cost of foreign investment by s
broadens the range of cases in which foreign investment can be dynamically ineffi cient. 
What value of s is suffi cient to satisfy (3) and therefore support dynamically ineffi cient 
foreign investment levels? This requires
(5) 
τ δ
τ
τ
> −
−
−
+
+
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
−
−
s g1 ( )τ τ
(1 )(1 )δ
1
1
(1 )
(1 )
.n
n*
* *
In using (5) to identify the magnitude of the required s, it is helpful to start by con-
sidering the case where the growth rate of the economy equals the fi rm’s opportunity 
cost of foreign investment; then g = δ, and (5) simplifi es to 
(6) 
τ δ
>
−
−
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
s ( )τ τ
(1 )
1
1
( )
.n
*
*
This case can be further simplifi ed to a setting of very short-lived investments (n = 1). 
In this case, a very small s, δ
δ τ− −
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥(1 )
( )τ τ
(1 )
,
*
*
 is suffi cient to encourage dynamically 
ineffi cient investment levels. As the discount rate that fi rms use to evaluate foreign 
investments is just equal to the economy’s growth rate, fi rms will undertake invest-
ments that are just at the margin of being dynamically ineffi cient even in the absence 
of an explicit subsidy. Starting from this knife-edged point, any value of s that more 
than offsets the home country tax on one-period returns is all that is required to support 
dynamically ineffi cient investment.
As the investment period lengthens, the s necessary to encourage dynamically inef-
fi cient investment grows; in the limit as n becomes very large, the required s equals the 
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domestic tax burden on a dollar of repatriated foreign profi ts, (τ – τ *)/(1 – τ *). Almost all 
of the cash fl ows received from a long-lived foreign investment are ultimately subject 
to home country taxation; said another way, the present value of the fi rm’s savings from 
the nontaxation of the portion of returns constituting return of paid-in equity diminishes 
over time to insignifi cance. Since the dollar originally invested abroad is therefore 
effectively taxed as a dividend, it is necessary for s to exceed the home country tax rate 
on foreign source dividends in order to induce dynamically ineffi cient investment. To 
the degree that deferral of home country taxation encourages fi rms to avoid repatriation 
and lengthen foreign investment periods — as many studies, including Desai, Foley, and 
Hines (2001), seem to indicate — then policies that reduce the cost of foreign investment 
by larger amounts are necessary to support dynamically ineffi cient investment levels.
Departing from the case where g = δ further illustrates the effi ciency consequences 
of different levels of s. Inspection of (5) indicates that higher values of δ increase the s 
necessary to support dynamically ineffi cient investment, whereas higher rates of g reduce 
it. When δ  > g, fi rms have high opportunity costs of funds that discourage dynamically 
ineffi cient investment. This condition appears to be empirically salient, as there is ample 
evidence that the opportunity cost of funds for the U.S. corporate sector exceeded the 
growth rate of the U.S. economy during the postwar period. For example, Fama and 
French (1999) calculate annual after-tax infl ation-adjusted investment returns earned 
by U.S. corporations from 1950–1996, reporting values that range between 6.0 and 7.8 
percent, depending on the estimation method. By contrast, the U.S. national income and 
product accounts indicate that infl ation-adjusted (chain weighted) U.S. GDP grew at a 
compound annual rate of 3.4 percent between the same years.2 Consequently, signifi cant 
tax subsidies would have been necessary to encourage dynamically ineffi cient foreign 
investment over this period.
What form might such tax subsidies take? Some studies, including Grubert and Mutti 
(2001), Grubert (2001), and Gravelle (2009), argue that the foreign tax credit, defer-
ral, expense allocation, and source of income rules effectively subsidize U.S. direct 
investment abroad. For example, the ability of taxpayers to treat some or all of U.S. 
export income as having foreign source, thereby making it untaxed for taxpayers who 
otherwise have excess foreign tax credits, and a similar treatment for royalty income 
for exploitation of U.S.-owned intangible property in foreign counties, is sometimes 
characterized as a subsidy for the foreign operations that generate the excess foreign 
tax credits. In addition, U.S. taxpayers are entitled to claim U.S. tax deductions for 
some U.S. expenses that contribute to the production of foreign income that is lightly 
taxed by the United States, and some argue that this too effectively subsidizes foreign 
income production.
It is certainly the case that the United States has many tax provisions that infl uence 
effective tax burdens on foreign income, though it should be noted that Desai and 
2 See U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, http://www.bea.gov/
national/nipaweb/index.asp.
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Hines (2004) offer evidence of signifi cant U.S. tax burdens — in the neighborhood 
of $50 billion annually — on U.S. direct investment abroad. The empirical exercise 
of evaluating cash fl ows presented below effectively considers the cumulative effect 
of all tax and other policies that infl uence levels of direct investment abroad. Evi-
dence of dynamic ineffi ciency would suggest that deferral, the foreign tax credit, and 
various other tax provisions combine to support ineffi ciently high foreign investment 
levels.
D. Dynamic Effi  ciency and Asset Ownership
Foreign investment is dynamically ineffi cient if it generates a suffi ciently low rate of 
return that the economy would be able to have greater resources available for domestic 
consumption every year by reducing its foreign investment level. It is important that 
dynamic effi ciency is defi ned in terms of consumption possibilities, as this criterion can 
differ signifi cantly from the effi ciency measure that comes from the exercise of compar-
ing home country returns to one dollar of foreign investment with home country returns 
to one dollar of domestic investment. The latter comparison is the basis of the capital 
export neutrality analysis, as elaborated by Musgrave (1963) and Horst (1980), which 
implicitly assumes that the cost of foreign investment is that the invested resources are 
thereby made unavailable to the domestic economy.
The reality is that most foreign direct investment takes the form of acquisitions of 
existing companies, and the impact of foreign investment largely takes the form of 
changing the ownership of capital assets, as noted by Desai and Hines (2003). For 
example, greater direct investment abroad by U.S. parent companies can be associated 
with greater foreign direct investment in the United States, since potential U.S. targets 
or other investment opportunities not chosen by U.S. investors who instead commit 
their funds abroad may as a consequence be capitalized upon by foreign fi rms. In such 
a setting, tax-induced changes to levels of direct investment abroad need not affect the 
size of the U.S. capital stock, but instead will infl uence the identity of who owns capital 
within and without the United States, and thereby also affect rates of return to those 
investments. Furthermore, even for U.S. fi rms investing abroad, the evidence offered 
by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2009) and others suggests that greater foreign investment 
levels are associated with expanded domestic investments.
The cash fl ow analysis used to evaluate the dynamic effi ciency of foreign investment 
applies with equal force to cases of shifting capital ownership. From the standpoint of 
the United States, the after-tax rate of return to domestic ownership of capital assets is 
the alternative to foreign investment returns, and this is the discount rate that fi rms use 
to evaluate investments. Abel et al. (1989) report evidence that the U.S. corporate sector 
is dynamically effi cient, implying that the discount rates used by U.S. fi rms to value 
their investments produces investment levels that support dynamically effi cient capital 
stocks. Consequently, foreign investments that appear dynamically effi cient from a cash 
fl ow standpoint are also effi cient compared to the alternative of changing ownership.
Tax Policy and the Effi  ciency of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad 1065
III. TESTING THE DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY OF U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT 
     ABROAD
Data on U.S. direct investment abroad are available to measure the extent that foreign 
investment is a net sink or source of U.S. funds, corresponding to the Abel et al. (1989) 
metric of dynamic effi ciency as applied to foreign investment. These data are based 
on annual surveys of U.S. multinational companies.3 The implication of the Abel et al. 
(1989) analysis is that, if foreign investment generates returns that exceed the resources 
it absorbs, then investment is dynamically effi cient; otherwise, it is not.
A. Evidence on U.S. Firms Investing Abroad
Column 1 of Table 1 presents annual information for repatriated earnings of foreign 
affi liates owned at least 10 percent by U.S. persons, the 10 percent ownership criterion 
corresponding to the threshold for direct investment. All of the entries in Table 1 are in 
current dollars. The reporting of repatriated earnings differs according to the organi-
zational form of foreign affi liates. Repatriated earnings include dividend repatriations 
from foreign subsidiaries plus all earnings of unincorporated (branch) affi liates. Figures 
for repatriated earnings make no adjustment for withholding taxes imposed by foreign 
governments on cross-border fl ows. Data for repatriated earnings are available at an 
annual frequency starting only in 1982, so Table 1 presents data for 1982–2010; the 
2010 fi gure is preliminary.
Column 2 of Table 1 presents annual U.S. net equity investments in foreign affi li-
ates owned at least 10 percent by U.S. persons; they are called equity outfl ows. Equity 
capital outfl ows occur when a U.S. parent increases its equity investment in one of 
its existing foreign affi liates or makes a new equity investment in a foreign business 
enterprise, either by acquiring an existing foreign business or by establishing a new 
one. Equity capital outfl ows are reduced when a U.S. parent reduces its equity inter-
est in an existing affi liate.4 Equity outfl ows do not include the reinvested earnings of 
incorporated affi liates, but they do include the reinvested earnings of branch affi liates; 
these earnings are treated in the statistics as though they were repatriated to the U.S. 
parent company and then invested anew in the foreign operations. Branches make up 
only a small fraction of all affi liates.
Column 3 of Table 1 presents the difference between distributed earnings and equity 
outfl ows. In 22 of these 29 years the difference is positive, refl ecting that distributed 
earnings exceeded equity outfl ows, or that the United States received greater returns than 
it invested abroad. Not surprisingly, the years when the difference is negative are those 
3 See U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_MNC.cfm.
4 As an illustration, if a U.S. fi rm invests $100 in a Spanish affi liate in year one, and sells the affi liate to a 
German acquirer for $300 cash in year eight, then the United States has a capital outfl ow of $100 in year 
one and a negative capital outfl ow of $300 in year eight.
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Table 1
U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Measures of Earnings and Investment
($Millions, Current Year U.S. Dollars)
Year
Distributed Earnings
(1)
Equity Outfl ows
(2)
Difference
(3) = (1) – (2)
1982  23,058   9,708  13,350
1983  18,628   7,249  11,379
1984  18,687   2,394  16,293
1985  19,780  –1,672  21,452
1986  26,077   1,147  24,930
1987  25,264   4,868  20,396
1988  41,744  –6,662  48,406
1989  43,257   6,395  36,862
1990  36,553   8,739  27,814
1991  33,945  17,682  16,263
1992  34,441  14,647  19,794
1993  28,847  24,565   4,282
1994  44,032  33,659  10,373
1995  38,891  40,484  –1,593
1996  45,623  27,532  18,091
1997  55,196  40,792  14,404
1998  56,742  72,447 –15,705
1999  62,536  98,929 –36,393
2000  52,863  78,040 –25,177
2001  53,234  60,942  –7,708
2002  54,600  42,707  11,893
2003  59,460  35,484  23,976
2004  81,555 133,277 –51,722
2005 298,712  61,937 236,775
2006 101,686  48,970  52,716
2007 132,833 200,850 –68,017
2008 155,414 145,531   9,883
2009  99,393  18,439  80,954
2010/p 104,403  46,741  57,662
Notes: This table displays measures of annual earnings and investment for U.S. Direct Investment 
Abroad. See Appendix Table A1 for defi nitions of each measure. Data for 2010 are preliminary.
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in which U.S. direct investment abroad shows particular strength, such as the period at 
the end of the 1990s. The amounts by which equity outfl ows exceed distributed earnings 
in the seven years in which this difference is positive tend to be rather modest compared 
to the amounts by which distributed earnings exceed equity outfl ows in other years. 
It is possible to calculate the net present value of the differences over the 1982–2010 
period, measured in 2010 dollars using nominal U.S. GDP as the relevant defl ator. 
This calculation implicitly takes the growth rate of U.S. GDP to be the discount factor, 
which is consistent with the theory that underlies the dynamic effi ciency calculations of 
Abel et al. (1989). By this measure, U.S. parent companies received $2.951 trillion of 
distributed earnings from their foreign affi liates over 1982–2010, and had only $1.817 
of net equity outfl ows, for a difference of $1.134 trillion. The distributed earnings of 
the foreign operations of U.S. companies were 162 percent of net equity outfl ows over 
this period, producing a sizeable net surplus.
Panel A of Figure 1 depicts cumulative discounted distributed earnings and equity 
outfl ows over the 1982–2010 period. The solid locus in the fi gure represents the cumu-
lative sum of distributed earnings scaled by the ratio of nominal 2010 U.S. GDP to 
nominal U.S. GDP at the time of earnings distribution, and the dotted locus represents the 
cumulative sum of scaled equity outfl ows. It is clear from the fi gure that the difference 
between cumulative distributed earnings and cumulative equity outfl ows is positive in 
every year and generally growing over time.
Data identifying distributed earnings and net equity outfl ows are not available annu-
ally prior to 1982; however, other measures of earnings and investment are available. 
Column 1 of Table 2 presents the sum of net interest receipts and distributed earnings 
received from foreign affi liates owned at least 10 percent by U.S. persons for each year 
starting in 1950. Distributed earnings are defi ned in the same way as in the calculation 
underlying column 1 of Table 1. Net interest receipts equal the difference between 
interest received by U.S. parent companies from their foreign affi liates and interest paid 
by U.S. parent companies to their foreign affi liates. In practice, U.S. parent companies 
receive considerably more interest from their foreign affi liates than they pay, which is 
why the entries in column 1 of Table 2 for 1982–2010 regularly exceed the correspond-
ing entries in column 1 of Table 1.
Column 2 of Table 2 presents the sum of net equity investments and other intercom-
pany outfl ows to foreign affi liates owned at least 10 percent by U.S. persons for each 
year from 1950–2010. Net equity investments are defi ned in the same way as in the 
calculation underlying column 2 of Table 1. Other intercompany outfl ows are annual 
differences in net intercompany indebtedness between parent companies and their foreign 
affi liates. Thus, for example, if a U.S. parent company loans its foreign affi liate $100, 
then other intercompany outfl ows increases by $100, and if a foreign affi liate loans its 
U.S. parent company $25, other intercompany outfl ows declines by $25.
Column 3 of Table 2 presents differences between the sum of distributed earnings 
and net interest receipts and the sum of equity investments and other intercompany 
outfl ows. In 49 of these 61 years the difference is positive, refl ecting that the United 
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Table 2
U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Alternative Measures of Earnings and Investment
($Millions, Current Year U.S. Dollars)
Year
Interest and 
Distributed Earnings
(1)
Equity and Intercompany 
Outfl ows
(2)
Difference
(3) = (1) – (2)
1950   1,294     621     673
1951   1,492     508     984
1952   1,420     852     568
1953   1,442     735     707
1954   1,725      667   1,058
1955   1,912     823   1,089
1956   2,171   1,951     220
1957   2,249   2,442    –193
1958   2,121   1,181     940
1959   2,206   1,372     834
1960   2,355   1,675     680
1961   2,768   1,599   1,169
1962   3,044   1,654   1,390
1963   3,129   1,976   1,153
1964   3,674   2,328   1,346
1965   3,963   3,468     495
1966   3,467   3,625    –158
1967   3,847   3,050     797
1968   4,152   2,855   1,297
1969   4,819   3,130   1,689
1970   4,992   4,413     579
1971   5,983   4,441   1,542
1972   6,416   3,214   3,202
1973   8,384   3,195   5,189
1974  11,379   1,275  10,104
1975   8,547   6,196   2,351
1976  11,303   4,253   7,050
1977  13,277   5,497   7,780
1978  14,115   4,713   9,402
1979  19,219   6,258  12,961
1980  20,129   2,205  17,924
1981  19,013  –3,912  22,925
1982  21,185  –3,729  24,914
1983  15,067  –4,155  19,222
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Table 2 (continued)
U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Alternative Measures of Earnings and Investment
($Millions, Current Year U.S. Dollars)
Year
Interest and 
Distributed Earnings
(1)
Equity and Intercompany 
Outfl ows
(2)
Difference
(3) = (1) – (2)
1984  14,357  –4,562  18,919
1985  15,706    –777  16,483
1986  22,915  9,972  12,943
1987  22,954  11,700  11,254
1988  40,443   4,525  35,918
1989  43,442  24,908  18,534
1990  38,335   9,546  28,789
1991  35,199  14,369  20,830
1992  35,625  26,353   9,272
1993  30,528  47,233 –16,705
1994  46,338  49,164  –2,826
1995  41,350  44,840  –3,490
1996  47,814  37,193  10,621
1997  57,311  46,791  10,520
1998  59,802  98,482 –38,680
1999  67,377 160,685 –93,308
2000  58,235  65,608  –7,373
2001  58,881  72,566 –13,685
2002  60,320  69,190  –8,870
2003  65,729  28,875  36,854
2004  87,698 153,316 –65,618
2005 304,854  46,551 258,303
2006 107,474  27,580  79,894
2007 140,229 183,511 –43,282
2008 163,703 111,619  52,084
2009 106,175  28,781  77,394
2010/p 110,169  29,753  80,416
Notes: This table displays measures of annual earnings and investment for U.S. Direct Investment Abroad. 
See Appendix Table A1 for defi nitions of each measure. Data for 2010 are preliminary.
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States received greater returns in dividends and interest than it invested abroad in the 
form of equity and debt. This series for 1982–2010 resembles the pattern in column 3 of 
Table 1, refl ecting the relative size of the equity components of investments and returns 
compared to the debt components. The amounts by which equity and debt outfl ows 
exceed distributed earnings and net interest in the 12 years in which this difference is 
positive tend to be of modest magnitude compared to the amounts by which equity and 
debt returns exceed equity and debt outfl ows in other years. The present value of divi-
dends and interest received from foreign affi liates over 1950–2010, taking the growth 
rate of U.S. GDP to be the discount rate, was $5.461 trillion, whereas the present value 
of equity and debt outfl ows was $3.347 trillion, for a difference of $2.114 trillion. This 
is a signifi cant surplus: returns from debt and equity investments over this period were 
163 percent of net debt and equity investments, a ratio of returns to investment that is 
very similar to that for just the equity component of investment over 1982–2010. Panel 
B of Figure 1 depicts cumulative returns and investments from 1950–2010, using the 
same scaling as in the fi gure in Panel A. As is evident from this fi gure, total investment 
returns consistently exceed total investment levels.
B. Interpreting The Evidence
The evidence indicates that U.S. parent companies received considerably more from 
their foreign affi liates in investment returns than the affi liates absorbed in investment 
resources, thereby suggesting that U.S. direct investment abroad is dynamically effi -
cient. There are, however, some considerations that may complicate the evaluation of 
this evidence. The fi rst is that the analysis of dynamic effi ciency is typically conducted 
by considering balanced growth paths. The foreign investment profi le of the United 
States, and that of most other capital exporting nations, may not correspond to steady 
state growth, since foreign investment has expanded rapidly in recent decades, a conse-
quence not only of globalization but also of foreign economic growth rates that exceed 
the U.S. rate. Equity and other intercompany outfl ows averaged 0.2114 percent of U.S. 
GDP over the 1950–1959 decade, but averaged 0.7623 percent of U.S. GDP over the 
2000–2009 decade. Since foreign investment rose signifi cantly as a fraction of the U.S. 
economy, even a highly effi cient foreign investment sector might absorb resources as 
fi rms reinvest their substantial profi ts abroad rather than immediately repatriating them 
to the United States. The relatively rapid growth of foreign economies therefore biases 
the cash fl ow test in favor of fi nding that foreign investment is dynamically ineffi cient, 
a consideration that strengthens the inference that the foreign investment sector is 
dynamically effi cient.
A second important consideration is that the available data refl ect reported earnings 
and investment levels, which include any tax-motivated adjustment of these items. One 
possibility is that the rate of return to foreign investment is overstated by U.S. fi rms 
that adjust the location of taxable income in order to report greater foreign profi ts at the 
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expense of domestic profi ts.5 The concern is that, as a result of this adjustment, foreign 
investment that is otherwise of limited profi tability, and possibly even dynamically 
ineffi cient, could appear to be dynamically effi cient.
Careful consideration of taxpayer incentives suggests that relocation of taxable income 
by U.S. taxpayers is unlikely to undermine the cash fl ow test of dynamic effi ciency. Firms 
with lightly taxed foreign profi ts do not have incentives to relocate taxable income from 
the United States to a low-tax foreign location if the foreign profi ts are to be immedi-
ately repatriated to the United States, since they will then be subject to U.S. taxation;6 
furthermore, such income relocation is typically costly. Hence fi rms have incentives 
to relocate taxable income out of the United States and into low-tax foreign locations 
only when they also have incentives to defer repatriation — which, as Hartman notes, 
requires that the after-foreign-tax foreign rate of return exceed the domestic discount 
rate. Furthermore, as the discussion of the Fama and French (1999) evidence indicates, 
the domestic discount rate exceeds the growth rate of the economy; thus, fi rms have 
incentives to relocate taxable income out of the United States only when their foreign 
rates of return exceed the growth rate of the economy.
This reasoning implies that tax-motivated income reallocation infl ates measured 
returns to foreign investment only if foreign investment is dynamically effi cient, which 
makes it possible to use measured returns to test for dynamic effi ciency. If U.S. direct 
investment abroad is dynamically ineffi cient, then true foreign rates of return are low 
and fi rms do not have incentives to defer repatriation; nor do fi rms have incentives to 
reallocate taxable income from the United States to low-tax foreign locations, which 
implies that measured foreign returns are accurate representations. If instead U.S. direct 
investment abroad is dynamically effi cient, then foreign rates of return are high and fi rms 
may have incentives to reallocate taxable income from the United States, as a result of 
which measured cash fl ows could overstate the profi tability of foreign investment. But 
5 There is ample evidence that reported rates of return to U.S. investment are higher in low-tax foreign 
locations than in high-tax foreign locations (e.g., Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Hines and Rice, 1994; Desai, 
Foley, and Hines, 2003; Clausing, 2009), which, together with the relatively high U.S. corporate tax rate, 
raises the possibility that the reported profi tability of U.S. direct investment abroad includes the effect of 
tax-motivated reallocation of taxable income.
6 There are some fi rms with excess foreign tax credits that would benefi t from relocating taxable income 
from the United States to low-tax foreign locations, even if U.S. taxation of the foreign income would 
not be deferred, since such fi rms would benefi t from increasing their foreign tax credit limits and thereby 
deploying some of their excess foreign tax credits to offset U.S. tax liabilities on the relocated income. 
Since the U.S. tax rate signifi cantly exceeds foreign tax rates, this is an uncommon situation; furthermore, 
U.S. fi rms have excess foreign tax credits only when their foreign tax rates exceed the U.S. tax rate, 
a scenario that does not usually raise concerns that there might be ineffi ciently high levels of foreign 
investment, or that large amounts of taxable income are allocated outside of the United States for tax 
purposes. It is nevertheless the case that some U.S. fi rms with excess foreign tax credits benefi t from 
reallocating U.S. income to low-tax foreign jurisdictions, and the aggregate data refl ect, in part, their 
behavior.
Tax Policy and the Effi  ciency of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad 1073
since this possibility arises only when foreign investment is dynamically effi cient, the 
use of reported foreign returns does not produce a misleading test of dynamic effi ciency.
Another consideration that arises in interpreting the evidence is that the data refl ect 
actual investment returns rather than the expected risk-adjusted returns envisioned by 
the theory of dynamic effi ciency. Consequently, foreign exchange gains and losses are 
included in reported returns, as is any risk premium associated with foreign exchange 
exposure. It is not clear to what extent U.S. fi rms were exposed to foreign exchange risk 
over the postwar period, and whether in practice they experienced gains or losses from 
currency movements. The magnitude of the risk premium is a function of the degree to 
which exposure to currency risks is priced, a topic of considerable debate; as exchange 
rates are prices, it is commonly assumed that there is no systematic risk associated with 
bearing currency risk, and consequently such risk is not priced to generate returns — 
though models with unequal hedging demands can give rise to currency risk premia 
and the evidence on uncovered interest parity is consistent with there being a return to 
holding currencies. U.S. fi rms investing abroad also face business and political risks 
that are refl ected in the valuation of these investments and in efforts by the fi rms to 
hedge these risks, as considered by, among others, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2008). As 
with currency risks, it is diffi cult to know the extent to which realized returns refl ect 
the outcomes of risky business investments and the risk premia associated with them. 
As long as realized returns do not differ systematically from expected returns to foreign 
investment, then the mere existence of risk does not undermine the use of reported 
returns to evaluate dynamic effi ciency; it is hard to conceive of scenarios under which 
riskiness alone would account for the large reported differences between foreign invest-
ment levels and foreign investment returns. 
Finally, the analysis treats repatriated income as the only U.S. return to its direct 
investment abroad. If foreign and domestic activities are complementary within fi rms, 
as the evidence offered by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2009) suggests, then some of the 
return to foreign investment may appear in enhanced returns to domestic activity, which 
is not captured by repatriations.
C. Foreign Direct Investment in the United States
There is nothing intrinsic to the process of foreign direct investment that makes its 
outcome dynamically effi cient. To illustrate this point, it is instructive to compare the 
evidence of investment returns and investment levels for U.S. direct investment abroad 
to parallel evidence for foreign direct investment in the United States. Table 3 presents 
data on distributed earnings and net equity outfl ows for foreign investors in the United 
States; cumulative earnings and outfl ows (discounted by U.S. GDP growth rates) are 
depicted in Panel A of Figure 2. This pattern is clearly distinguishable from that for 
U.S. direct investment abroad, as net equity outfl ows exceed cumulative earnings every 
year. A very similar pattern appears in Table 4 using the broader investment and return 
concepts employed in Table 2 for U.S. direct investment abroad that include returns 
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Table 3
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: 
Measures of Earnings and Investment
($Million, Current Year U.S. Dollars)
Year
Distributed Earnings
(1)
Equity Infl ows
(2)
Difference
(3) = (1) – (2)
1982  3,486   9,723   –6,237
1983  3,344   8,699   –5,355
1984  3,508  15,044  –11,536
1985  4,574  15,214  –10,640
1986  4,700  25,086  –20,386
1987  4,785  34,319  –29,534
1988  6,113  45,046  –38,933
1989  7,958  51,776  –43,818
1990  9,367  56,239  –46,872
1991  7,601  45,811  –38,210
1992  7,036  31,635  –24,599
1993  8,874  29,674  –20,800
1994 10,272  37,210  –26,938
1995 13,757  47,890  –34,133
1996 15,487  63,734  –48,247
1997 18,801  59,498  –40,697
1998 25,214 147,091 –121,877
1999 33,906 221,562 –187,656
2000 37,274 259,641 –222,367
2001 25,410 140,901 –115,491
2002 21,191 105,343  –84,152
2003 43,257  93,420  –50,163
2004 36,287  92,905  –56,618
2005 64,395  70,725   –6,330
2006 63,230 115,027  –51,797
2007 49,280 152,807 –103,527
2008 43,047 261,583 –218,536
2009 40,230  94,762  –54,532
2010/p 33,306  76,855  –43,549
Notes: This table displays measures of annual earnings and investment for U.S. Foreign Direct Invest-
ment. See Appendix Table A1 for defi nitions of each measure. Data for 2010 are preliminary.
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Table 4
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States:
 Alternative Measures of Earnings and Investment
($Million, Current Year U.S. Dollars)
Year
Interest and 
Distributed Earnings
 (1)
Equity and Intercompany 
Infl ows
(2)
Difference
(3) = (1) – (2)
1950    169      80       89
1951    186      90       96
1952    181     131       50
1953    195     158       37
1954    176     124       52
1955    180     197      –17
1956    177     232      –55
1957    187     155       32
1958    213      98      115
1959    219     238      –19
1960    220     141       79
1961    194      73        121
1962    185     132       53
1963    223      –5      228
1964    202      –5      207
1965    298      57      241
1966    371      86      285
1967    381     251      130
1968    388     319       69
1969    417     832     –415
1970    441   1,030     –589
1971    621    –175      796
1972    715     380      335
1973    699   1,890   –1,191
1974    266   3,695   –3,429
1975  1,046   1,414     –368
1976  1,451   2,687   –1,236
1977  1,248   2,142     –894
1978  1,628   5,313   –3,685
1979  2,402   7,921   –5,519
1980  3,303  11,740   –8,437
1981  3,694  22,250  –18,556
1982  5,651  16,171  –10,520
1983  5,606  11,858   –6,252
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Table 4 (continued)
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: 
Alternative Measures of Earnings and Investment
($Million, Current Year U.S. Dollars)
Year
Interest and 
Distributed Earnings
(1)
Equity and Intercompany 
Infl ows
(2)
Difference
(3) = (1) – (2)
1984  6,438  22,462  –16,024
1985  7,603  20,400  –12,797
1986  7,820  36,384  –28,564
1987  8,209  59,002  –50,793
1988 11,023  56,608  –45,585
1989 15,171  76,400  –61,229
1990 17,534  62,578  –45,044
1991 16,046  41,483  –25,437
1992 13,800  31,433  –17,633
1993 15,005  58,424  –43,419
1994 17,268  41,237  –23,969
1995 21,893  49,351  –27,458
1996 24,586  77,996  –53,410
1997 27,983  90,634  –62,651
1998 35,576 176,203 –140,627
1999 49,309 285,316 –236,007
2000 57,171 321,536 –264,365
2001 46,634 200,870 –154,236
2002 41,660  82,788  –41,128
2003 59,464  49,463    10,001
2004 50,225  96,437  –46,212
2005 79,599  70,905    8,694
2006 81,654 174,035  –92,381
2007 73,955 216,031 –142,076
2008 68,545 281,342 –212,797
2009 65,525 106,222  –40,697
2010/p 57,964 101,326  –43,362
Notes: This table displays measures of annual earnings and investment for U.S. Foreign Direct Investment. 
See Appendix Table A1 for defi nitions of each measure. Data for 2010 are preliminary.
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to intercompany loans; these cumulative returns and investment levels are depicted in 
Panel B of Figure 2.
The evidence for foreign direct investment in the United States serves as a reminder 
that the method of comparing investment returns and new investment levels need not 
generate the conclusion that investment is dynamically effi cient, since foreign direct 
investment in the United States appears not to be dynamically effi cient. A number of 
studies, including Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), Gourinchas and Rey (2007), Habib 
(2010), and Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot (2010), measure and attempt to explain the 
low rate of return that foreign investors earn on portfolio as well as direct investment in 
the United States, describing the apparent anomaly as an “exorbitant privilege” attribut-
able to the market power of the United States in world capital markets. Other potential 
explanations include the possibility that foreign governments effectively subsidize 
investment in the United States, or that foreign investment returns in the United States 
are systematically understated.
IV. CONCLUSION
U.S. direct investment abroad generates sizeable positive cash fl ows measured net of 
new outfl ows — not quite every year, but in most years, that in the aggregate exceed $1 
trillion for equity investments from 1982–2010 and $2 trillion for equity and debt invest-
ments from 1950–2010. These large net cash fl ows imply that U.S. foreign investment 
is dynamically effi cient, so reduced investment today entails fewer income fl ows from 
abroad in the future. Consequently, concerns that U.S. tax policies provide subsidies 
that lead to dynamically ineffi cient foreign investment levels appear to be misplaced.
The fi nding that direct investment abroad is dynamically effi cient should not be 
interpreted either as an endorsement of current U.S. tax policy or a claim that current 
policy is effi cient in all respects. The impact, and appropriate design, of the taxation of 
foreign income has undergone a reevaluation in recent years, with new considerations 
and previously unidentifi ed distortions taking on great signifi cance. From the standpoint 
of a capital-exporting country in a growing world economy, the consequences of too 
much or too little foreign investment are potentially quite large, refl ecting the costs 
either of allocating resources to foreign investments generating small returns or the 
foregone opportunity to earn signifi cant annual positive cash fl ows that might then be 
redeployed. Further consideration of the impact of tax policies on the structure, conduct, 
and performance of foreign investment are likely to raise other issues, and with them, 
tests of other aspects of effi ciency.
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Type of 
Investment       Data item             Defi nition
U.S. Direct 
Investment 
Abroad
Distributed Earnings For incorporated foreign affi liates, distributed earnings are dividends on common and 
preferred stock held by U.S. parents. Distributions can be paid out of current or past earn-
ings, and earnings are U.S. parents’ shares in the net income of their foreign affi liates after 
provision for foreign income taxes and excluding capital gains or losses. For unicorporated 
affi liates, distributed earnings equal U.S. parents’ shares in the net income of their foreign 
affi liates after provision for foreign income taxes, excluding capital gains or losses. With-
holding taxes are not considered.
Interest Interest measures interest paid by the foreign affi liate to the U.S. parent on loans made to 
the affi liate by the parent net of interest received by the foreign affi liate from the U.S. par-
ent group. U.S. and foreign withholding taxes and not considered.
Equity Outfl ows Equity outfl ows measure increases in equity capital outfl ows net of decreases in equity 
capital outfl ows. Increases in equity capital outfl ows occur when a U.S. parent increases its 
equity investment in one of its existing foreign affi liates or makes a new equity investment 
in a foreign business enterprise, either by acquiring an existing foreign business or by estab-
lishing a new one. Decreases in equity capital outfl ows occur when a U.S. parent reduces its 
equity interest in an existing affi liate.
Equity and Other 
Intercompany 
Outfl ows
Equity and other intercompany outfl ows include equity outfl ows and intercompany debt 
outfl ows. Intercompany debt fl ows consist of the increase in foreign affi liates’ net intercom-
pany debt to U.S. parent groups.
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Type of 
Investment       Data item             Defi nition
Foreign Direct 
Investment in 
the United States
Distributed Earnings For incorporated U.S. affi liates, distributed earnings are dividends on common and pre-
ferred stock held by foreign parents. Distributions can be paid out of current or past earn-
ings, and earnings are foreign parents’ shares in the net income of their U.S. affi liates after 
provision for foreign income taxes and excluding capital gains or losses. For unicorporated 
affi liates, distributed earnings equal foreign parents’ shares in the net income of their U.S. 
affi liates after provision for foreign income taxes, excluding capital gains or losses. With-
holding taxes are not considered.
Interest Interest measures interest paid by the U.S. affi liate to the foreign parent on loans made to 
the affi liate by the parent net of interest received by the U.S. affi liate from the foreign par-
ent group. U.S. and foreign withholding taxes and not considered.
Equity Infl ows Equity infl ows measure increases in equity capital infl ows net of decreases in equity capital 
infl ows. Increases in equity capital infl ows occur when a foreign parent increases its equity 
investment in one of its existing U.S. affi liates or makes a new equity investment in a 
foreign business enterprise, either by acquiring an existing foreign business or by establish-
ing a new one. Decreases in equity capital infl ows occur when a foreign parent reduces its 
equity interest in an existing U.S. affi liate.
Equity and Other 
Intercompany 
Infl ows
Equity and other intercompany infl ows include equity infl ows and intercompany debt 
infl ows. Intercompany debt fl ows consist of the increase in U.S. affi liates’ net intercompany 
debt to foreign parent groups.
Appendix Table A1 (continued)
Defi nitions
